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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After several months delay due to Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) leaks in the External
Tank (ET) 17" LH2 umbilical disconnect, Atlantis was launched at 6:48 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time (EST) on November 15, 1990. Atlantis was cleared for launch after the
replacement of the ET 17" umbilical disconnect and a successful tanking test on October
24, 1990. The STS-38 Department of Defense mission was the seventh mission for
Atlantis and the fifth night launch in the Space Shuttle Program history. No technical
concerns were encountered during the countdown.
The end of the STS-38 mission was extended by one day because of high
crosswinds at the primary landing site, Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. On
the next day, November 20, 1990, the winds were too high for a safe landing at EAFB,
and a decision was made to select the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) as the primary landing site. The deorbit burn was performed on
orbit 79 of the STS-38 mission. Reentry and descent were effected with no problems.
Atlantis touched down on SLF runway 33 at 4:42 p.m. EST on November 20, 1990. This
was the sixth Space Shuttle landing at KSC.
Postlanding inspection of Atlantis' exterior found little evidence of damage. There
has been a concern about returning an Orbiter to KSC, because the last mission to do
so experienced tire failure. Atlantis' tires and brakes were in excellent condition with no
indication of excessive wear.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space
Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a
change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk
factors impacting STS-38 flight were also documented prior to the STS-38 Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and the STS-38 Launch Minus Two Day (L-2)
Review (L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety
risk factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to
the Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-38 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and
factors that were unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I
for discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-38 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission-related information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-38 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-38
flight.
Section 4 Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-38.
Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-41 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-36
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter Vehicle (OV-104).
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-38
mission. Those IFAs that are considered to represent a safety
risk will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle
flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-38 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of STS-38 Mission
After several months delay due to Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) leaks in the External
Tank (ET) 17" LH2 umbilical disconnect, Atlantis was launched at 6:48 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time (EST) on November 15, 1990. Atlantis was cleared for launch after the
replacement of the ET 17" umbilical disconnect and a successful tanking test on
October 24, 1990. The STS-38 Department of Defense (DoD) mission was the seventh
mission for Atlantis and the fifth night launch in the Space Shuttle Program history. No
technical concerns were encountered during the countdown.
During this classified mission, no reports or accounts were given relative to mission
operations. Based on the limited number and relatively benign Inflight Anomalies
(IFAs) recorded, the mission was considered extremely successful. Some unidentified
debris was observed falling from the base of both Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) during
ascent; however, it is believed that this debris was aluminized tape used during
prelaunch SRB closeout operations. Postflight inspection found no indication of adverse
heat effects in the region of the Thrust Vector Control systems components.
Disassembly of both Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) igniter joints found putty blowholes and
resulting sooting. Damage to the Gask-O-Seal retainer cadmium plating was also
reported. The sooting and damage to the cadmium plating were considered to be within
the experience base of recent missions and, therefore, was not recorded as an IFA.
Putty blowholes are an expected occurrence and will be the norm on future SRMs until
a redesign of the igniter joint, which includes removing the putty, is implemented in late
1991.
The end of the STS-38 mission was extended by one day because of high
crosswinds at the primary landing site, Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. On
the next day, November 20, 1990, the winds were too high for a safe landing at EAFB,
and a decision was made to select the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) as the primary landing site. The deorbit burn was performed on
orbit 79 of the STS-38 mission. Reentry and descent was effected with no problems.
Atlantis touched down on SLF runway 33 at 4:42 p.m. EST on November 20, 1990. This
was the sixth Space Shuttle landing at KSC.
Postlanding inspection of Atlantis' exterior found little evidence of damage. There
has been a concern about returning an Orbiter to KSC, because the last mission to do
so experienced tire failure. Atlantis' tires and brakes were in excellent condition with no
indication of excessive wear. Atlantis rolled approximately 8,900 feet after touchdown.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: November 15, 1990
• Launch Time: 6:48 p.m. EST
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39A
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
• Landing Site: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
• Landing Date: November 20, 1990
• Landing Time: 4:42 p.m. EST
• Mission Duration: 4 days, 21 hours, 54 minutes, 28 seconds
Crew Size: 5
Orbiter: OV-104 (7)Atlantis
SSMEs: (1) #2019, (2) #2022, (3) #2027
ET: ET-40
SRBs: BI-039
SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #12
MLP: MLP #1
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ENGINE #2019 #2022 # 2027
POWERHEAD #2020 #2022 #4004
MCC* #2023 #4006 #2024
NOZZLE #2024 #2023 #2027
CONTROLLER F4 F7 F23
FASCOS* #23 #22 #20
HPFTP* #6008 #6007 #4109R1
LPFTP* #2022R1 #2024 #4005
HPOTP* #2323R3 #4107R3 # 9309 R 1
LPOTP* #2025 R 1 #2104R 1 # 4302
" Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Partially Fixed Orifice Flow Control Valves
STS-38/OV-104 is the second Space Shuttle that flew with partially fixed orifice
Gaseous Oxygen (GO,) Flow Control Valves (FCVs). The current active GO2 FCVs used
in the External Tank (ET) Liquid Oxygen (LO2) tank pressurization system will be
replaced by Main Propulsion System (MPS) GO2 fixed orifices. The (302 FCVs are used
to return gas from the Main Engines back to the ET to maintain ullage pressure. The
fixed orifice has been approved for Space Shuttle fleet implementation pending
operational assessment and performance verification [Program Requirements Control
Board Document (PRCBD) $50509R2]. Approval was based on results of the feasibility
assessment performed by Space Shuttle Engineering/Level II and the supporting
contributions of the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) ET Project. Incorporation of
the fixed orifice hardware and procedures into the MPS eliminates some of the
criticality (Crit) 1 and 1R failure modes associated with the current FCVs which include
the valves, the associated electronics, and the pressure-sensing transducers.
Flight tests with the FCVs shimmed for intermediate flow rates will be used to
verify the analytical model and the final orifice size selection. The FCV stroke between
high-flow and low-flow positions will be gradually reduced over the course of 3 flights
until the valves are fixed in one position. The ET GO2 vent/relief valve pressure was
increased from 24 pounds per square inch gage (psig) to 31 psig on STS-38 by replacing
the spherical spring sensing assembly. This reduced the minimum ullage pressure from
16.0 psig to 14.2 psig, reduced 4 Crit 1R failure modes to Crit 3, and eliminated the
effects of 15 other failure modes. The 31-psig GO2 vent/relief valve was test qualified.
The current schedule leading to the implementation of fixed FCVs is as follows:
Vehicle High Flow Low Flow
STS-31 OV-103 100% 42%
STS-41 OV-103 Step 1 93% 55%
STS-38 OV-104 Step 2 85% 66%
STS-35 OV-102 Step 1 93% 55%
TBD TBD Fixed 78% ---
STS41 was the first of the series of flights with partially fixed orifices that will
lead to implementation of a fixed orifice FCV. Final implementation of GO2 fixed
orifices has not been scheduled. The current selection for the final fixed setting is at
78% flow; however, this value is subject to review and change in accordance with the
test results from the previous flights with partially-shimmed FCVs.
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2.4 STS-38 Booster Assemblies
The Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) for STS-38, BI-039, flew with the Ordnance
Ring Pin and Pin Retainer modification. This is the first step in resolving the loss of
Ordnance Ring Pins experienced on many flights, the last on STS-36 (see Section 6,
SRB 1 for details). The modification incorporates a deeper groove in the pin that
results in a tighter fit between the pin and the outer retainer legs. The center tang on
the retainer was modified to fit over the pin head. Six new design retainers and pins
were installed on each SRB.
The propellent cast in the fight-hand aft Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) segment
contained aluminum from the Reynolds Aluminum Company. Reynolds was qualified as
1 of 3 aluminum suppliers in 1985; however, their product has not yet flown. Aluminum
powder from Reynolds was used on all segments of the Development Motor (DM)-7
static test motor in 1985. Post-test analysis of the demonstrated ballistic parameters
showed that all requirements were achieved and the motor performance was close to
predicted. Reynolds aluminum powder was also used to cast segments used in
Qualification Motors (QM)-6, DM-9, QM-7, and QM-8.
2.5 Payload Data
The payload is classified.
Headquarters NASA Safety and Mission Quality did not participate in the safety
reviews for the DoD payloads. NASA Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS, did
participate in review of the Integrated Cargo Hazard Report (ICHR) by the System
Safety Review Panel (SSRP).
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-38 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-38 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-38 flight (Section 7). The list
indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item
is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description
of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM COMMENT
Section 4;
Orbiter 14
SSME 3
Re_olved STS-38 Safety Ri_k Factors
STS-38/OV-104 Reaction
Control System (RCS)
thruster oxidizer leaks.
RCS thruster RIU exhibited low
Chamber Pressure (Pc) on first firing
during STS-38 operations. Performance
during this firing was nominal, except for
the low Pc. The crew manually
transitioned R1U to the lowest priority,
but did not deselect it. Postlanding R1U
decay tests determined a pressure drop
of 6 to 8 pounds per square inch (psi) in
a 2-hour period. Sniff checks have
indicated no leak. (See Section 7,
Orbiter 7 for further details).
(IFA No. STS-38-07)
POGO precharge pressure
software anomaly.
A post-Main Engine Cutoff (MECO)
Fault Identification (FID) on engine #1
was presented during STS-38. This FID
indicated that the POGO precharge
pressure transducer failed qualification
limits on the low side. POGO precharge
pressure limits were implemented in
AR01, a recent Space Shuttle Main
Engine (SSME) controller software
upgrade, and used on STS-38; however,
because this FID was presented after
nominal engine performance and
shutdown, it was not considered a
problem. For STS-39 and subsequent
flights, POGO precharge pressure
qualification limits will be inhibited after
MECO + 16 seconds to preclude
recurrence of this problem.
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Section 4:
SRM 6
ITEM COMMENT
Resolved STS-38 Safety_ Risk Factors
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
Ignition Initiator (SII) leak
test.
Disassembly and inspection of STS-38
SIh did not identify grease in the leak
check ports. An indentation was found
on the left-hand SII O-ring; however,
there was no resulting blowby. On the
right-hand SII, raised metal (described
as a bubble) was found in the leak check
port; it was believed to be the result of
the original machining process. Neither
of these findings inhibited SII
performance and were not considered
safety concerns.
Section 6:
Orbiter 3
STS-36 lnflight Anomalies
RCS thruster R3D failed
"off' during External Tank
separation.
IFA No. STS-36-04
Orbiter 12 Thruster R4R failed "off'
during pre-entry hot-fire
test.
IFA No. STS-36-12
RCS thruster R1U exhibited low Po on
first firing during STS-38 operations.
Performance during this firing was
nominal, except for the low P¢. The
crew manually transitioned RIU to the
lowest priority, but did not deselect it.
Postlanding R1U decay tests determined
a pressure drop of 6 to 8 psi in a 2-hr
period. Sniff checks have indicated no
leak. (See Section 7, Orbiter 7 for
further details).
(IFA No. STS-38-07)
RCS thruster R1U exhibited low Po on
first firing during STS-38 operations.
Performance during this firing was
nominal, except for the low Pc. The
crew manually transitioned RIU to the
lowest priority, but did not deselect it.
Postlanding RIU decay tests determined
a pressure drop of 6 to 8 psi in a 2-hr
period. Sniff checks have indicated no
leak. (See Section 7, Orbiter 7 for
further details).
(IFA No. STS-38-07)
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-38 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-38. These items were reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to rationale for flight is based on findings
resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Prelaunch Assessment Review
(PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) evaluations (or other special
panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with
actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve
each specific problem.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
risk factor, or if the associated FIR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
The following risk factors, contained in this section, represent a low-to-moderate
increase in risk above the Level I approved Hazard Risk baseline. The NASA safety
community assessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated
increase was acceptable.
Orbiter 7 Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator Valve Module issue.
Orbiter 10 OV-102 20-psi helium regulator leak.
Orbiter 11 Fuel Cell separator plate plating defects.
SRM 2 Putty on igniter inner gasket of test motors.
SRM 3 STS-31 right Solid Rocket Motor igniter adapter-to-forward
dome joint putty blowhole.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-38 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATION
1
2
Liquid Hydrogen leaks on STS-35/OV-102 and STS-38/OV-104.
Holddown Post cracks.
PAGE
4-5
4-7
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Nose Landing Gear axle bearing nut.
Untempered martensite in the Nose Landing Gear.
OV-105 Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve broken poppet.
External leak of STS-35/OV-102 1/4" Liquid Oxygen flex hose.
Outer ring movement on Preload Indicating washers on Liquid
Hydrogen Orbiter/Space Shuttle Main Engine interface on OV-103.
Wing struts below-minimum wall thickness.
Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator Valve Module issue,
Main Propulsion System joint weld issue.
Cracks in Auxiliary Power Unit dynatube fittings.
OV-102 20-psi helium regulator leak.
Fuel Cell separator plate plating defects.
OV-104 Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve power "on" violation.
Freon leaks in Flash Evaporator Subsystem on STS-38/OV-104.
STS-38/OV-104 Reaction Control System thruster oxidizer leaks.
Thermal Protection System damage as a result of thruster R4D
oxidizer leak.
OV-104 Engine Interface Unit Power-On Reset anomaly.
Damage resulting from horizontal access beam free fall in aft
compartment.
STS-38/OV-104 Flash Evaporator System water supply valve retest
criteria.
Inertial Measurement Unit #2 "power conditioner fail" Built-In Test
Equipment indication.
Gaseous Nitrogen Shutoff Valve weld failure on OV-105.
STS-41/OV-103 Right-Hand elevon cove components found charred
during postflight inspection.
4-9
4-10
4-11
4-12
4-13
4-14
4-15
4-17
4-18
4-20
4-22
4-24
4-25
4-26
4-27
4-27
4-29
4-31
4-32
4-34
4-35
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SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-38 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
SSME
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Engine #0213 spark igniter potential failure. 4-36
Low-Pressure Fuel duet tripod cracks. 4-37
POGO precharge pressure software anomaly. 4-39
Potential for defects in critical zone of Liquid Oxygen main injector 4-40
posts on engines #2019 and #2022.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump turbine beating support crack. 4-41
Stennis Space Center test stand Frantz screen failure. 4-42
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump second stage rotor crack. 4-44
Engine #2031 High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump seal fragments. 4-46
Space Shuttle Main Engine controller software High-Pressure Oxidizer 4-47
Turbopump intermediate seal purge pressure anomaly.
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump bearing etching/corrosion issue. 4-48
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump first stage turbine disc cracking. 4-50
Preburner fuel duct failed during proof test. 4-51
SRB
1
2
3
4
5
Hydraulic system Quick Disconnect spring anomalies. 4-53
Solid Rocket Booster hydraulic pump failure during acceptance 4-54
testing.
STS-38 Reservoir Linear Variable Differential Transformer problem. 4-55
Actuator brackets found cracked during refurbishment of aft skirt. 4-56
Improper spotface on Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control 4-58
Check Valve Filter Assembly and piston accumulators.
SRM
1
2
3
4
Potential Solid Rocket Motor thrust imbalance.
Putty on igniter inner gasket of test motors.
STS-31 right Solid Rocket Motor ign/ter adapter-to-forward dome
joint putty blowhole.
Debris in the Solid Rocket Motor nozzle flex bearing cavity.
4-60
4-61
4-62
4-63
4-3 STS-38 Postflight Edition
SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-38 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SRM
5
6
7
RISK
FACTOR
Aft dome factory joint internal insulation voids.
Solid Rocket Motor Ignition Initiator leak test.
STS-41 Stat-O-Seal rubber damage.
PAGE
4-64
4-65
4-67
KSC
1
2
Liquid Oxygen T-0 carrier plate anomaly.
T-0 umbilical foot support.
4-68
4-68
GFE
1 Unrestrained camcorder during STS-38 ascent/descent. 4-70
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SECTION 5
STS-41 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-41/OV-103 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each anomaly in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
The following risk factors, contained in this section, represent a low-to-moderate
increase in risk above the Level I approved Hazard Risk baseline. The NASA safety
community assessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated
increase was acceptable.
SRM 1 Solid Rocket Motor igniter outer joint putty blowholes with
cadmium plating damage and sooting.
5-1 STS-38 Postflight Edition
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ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO. ANOMALY
INTEGRATION
1
2
3
System Management Nominal Bus Assignment Table General Purpose
Computer #2 assignment anomaly on STS-41.
Aft compartment hydrogen concentration high during ascent.
Left-hand Solid Rocket Booster aft strut separation device NASA
Standard Initiator detonator separated from the pressure cartridge.
PAGE
5-3
5-4
5-6
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater system "B"
failed on during STS-41.
Inertial Measurement Unit #1 experienced Z-axis accelerometer
transients.
Backup Flight Software backup cabin delta pressure/delta
temperature alarm was triggered at Main Engine Cutoff.
STS-41 Commander's left-hand Attitude Direction Indicator rate scale
switch failure.
Orbiter/External Tank Liquid Hydrogen aft attach/separation hole
plugger failed.
STS-41 left-hand Rotational Hand Controller trim inhibit switch
indicated a contact miscompare.
5-8
5-12
5-13
5-14
5-15
5-16
SRM
1
2
Solid Rocket Motor igniter outer joint putty blowholes with cadmium
plating damage and sooting.
Abnormal erosion on Solid Rocket Motor aft segment factory joint
internal insulation.
5-19
5-22
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SECTION 6
STS-36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
OV-104/STS-36 mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter Vehicle. Each anomaly is
briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
risk factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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STSo36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
RISK
FACTOR
_FEGt_ATION
Engine #2027, noz_e #2027 bluing.
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Fuel Cell #2 Alternating Current phase "A" inverter failure.
Liquid Hydrogen 17" disconnect "B" open indication intermittent.
Reaction Control System thruster R3D failed "off" during External
Tank separation.
Right Reaction Control System manifold #1 oxidizer isolation valve
position indication intermittent.
Left Reaction Control System 3/4/5 "]3" oxidizer tank isolation valve
open position indication intermittent.
Left Reaction Control System 1/2 oxidizer crossfeed valve closed
position indication intermittent.
Water Spray Boiler #2 vent system "A" heater failed.
STS-36 Auxiliary Power Unit # 1 hydraulic flex hose anomaly.
Cathode Ray Tube #4 screen went blank.
Oxygen bleed orifice leak.
Free water found near humidity separator "A".
Thruster R4R failed off during pre-entry hot-fire test.
Flash Evaporator System controller "A" shutdown.
STS-36 hydraulic system depressurization anomaly.
PAGE
6-3
6-4
6-4
6-5
6-6
6-7
6-8
6-9
6-10
6-18
6-19
6-20
6-21
6-22
6-23
SRB
1
SRM
1
Left Solid Rocket Booster ordnance ring pin embedded in External
Tank Attach ring foam.
Right Solid Rocket Motor igniter/forward dome boss interface surface
metal pitting and Gask-O-Seal damage.
6-27
6-28
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SECTION 7
STS-38 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-38/OV-104 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
7-1 STS-38 Postflight Edition
SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-38 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
ORBITER
2
RISK
FACTOR
Water Spray Boiler #2 did not cool Auxiliary Power Unit lube oil
while under operation of controller "A".
Flash Evaporator System water supply accumulator heater system
biased low.
Auxiliary Power Unit #3 X-axis acceleration trace erratic.
Vacuum cleaner short circuit.
Auxiliary Power Unit Exhaust Gas Temperature instrumentation
interaction with injector tube temperature instrumentation.
Right vent door 1, 2 purge position failure.
Thruster R1U showed low chamber pressure.
Continuous "tire press" Fault Detection and Annunciator message
following landing gear sating.
Transient smoke detector event indication anomaly.
PAGE
7-3
7-3
7-4
7-4
7-5
7-5
7-6
7-6
7-7
SRB
1 Unidentified debris observed between Mission Elapsed Time
26 seconds to 40 seconds from base region of both Solid Rocket
Boosters.
Right Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attachment ring missing
Instafoam at forward face.
7-8
7-9
MOD
1 Unexpected General Purpose Computer #3 talkback indication. 7-10
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 6. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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w
AC
ADI
AFB
AOS
APU
AR
ATP
BB
BFS
BITE
C
CA
CB
CEI
CRES
Crit
CRT
CVFA
DEU
DFRC
DM
DoD
DPS
DSC
DU
EAFB
ECP
EGT
EIU
EPD&C
EST
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Alternating Current
Attitude Direction Indicator
Air Force Base
Acquisition of Signal
Auxiliary Power Unit
Accepted Risk
Acceptance Test Procedure
Barrier-Booster
Backup Flight Software
Built-In Test Equipment
Controlled
California
Circuit Breaker
Contract End Item
Corrosion Resistant Steel
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Check Valve Filter Assembly
Data Entry Unit
Display Electronic Units
Dryden Flight Research Center
Development Motor
Department of Defense
Data Processing Software System
Designated Signal Conditioner
Display Unit
Edwards Air Force Base
Engineering Change Proposal
Exhaust Gas Temperature
Engine Interface Unit
Electrical Power Distribution and Control
Eastern Standard Time
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
ET
ETA
F
FASCOS
FC
FCHL
FCL
FCS
FCV
FD
FDA
FES
FID
FMEA/CIL
FOS
FP
FPB
FRR
FSM
ft
g
GG
GGVM
GH_
GN2
GO_
GOAL
GOX
GPC
n 2
HCF
HDP
HGDS
HPFTP
HPOTP
HPU
HR
External Tank
External Tank Attach
External Tank Attachment
Fahrenheit
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Fuel Cell
Flight Control Hydraulics Laboratory
Freon Coolant Loop
Flight Control System
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day
Fault Detection and Annunciator
Flash Evaporator System
Flash Evaporator Subsystem
Fault Identification
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Fuel Pump
Fuel Preburner
Flight Readiness Review
Flight Support Motor
Feet
Gravitational Acceleration
Gas Generator
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Hydrogen
Gaseous Nitrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
Ground Operations Aerospace Language
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
Hydrogen
High-Cycle Fatigue
Holddown Post
Hazardous Gas Detection System
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hydraulic Power Units
Hazard Report
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
hr
Hz
ICHR
ID
IEA
IFA
IMU
in-lb
IUS
JSC
KSC
L-2
Ib
lbf
LCC
LCF
LCN
LD
LH
LH2
LO2
LOX
LPF
LPFTP
LPOTP
LPS
LSFR
LVDT
MCC
MCF
ME
MECO
MET
min
MLP
Hour
Hertz
Integrated Cargo Hazard Report
Inside Diameter
Integrated Electronic Assembly
Inflight Anomaly
Inertial Measurement Unit
Inch-Pound
Inertial Upper Stage
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Launch Minus 2 Day
Pound
Pounds Force
Launch Commit Criteria
Low-Cycle Fatigue
Logic Change Notice
Leak Detector
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure Fuel
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Process Sequencer
Launch Processing Set
Launch Site Flow Review
Linear Variable Differential Transducer
Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
Major Component Failure
Main Engine
Main Engine Cutoff
Mission Elapsed Time
Minute
Mobile Launch Platform
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MMT
MPS
MRB
MS
MSE
MSFC
N2
N20,
NASA
NBAT
NLG
NSI
NSRS
2
OD
OMRSD
OMS
OPB
OPF
OPO
OSMQ
OV
P/N
PAR
Po
PCV
PLI
POR
ppm
PR
PRCB
PRCBD
psi
psia
psig
PSN
QC
QD
Mission Management Team
Main Propulsion System
Material Review Board
Mission Specialist
Mission Safety Evaluation
Marshall Space Flight Center
Nitrogen
Nitrogen Tetroxide
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nominal Bus Assignment Table
Nose Landing Gear
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
Oxygen
Outside Diameter
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Oxidizer Preburner
Orbiter Processing Facility
Orbiter Project Office
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Orbiter
Part Number
Prelaunch Assessment Review
Chamber Pressure
Pulse Control Valve
Preload Indicating
Power-On Reset
Parts Per Million
Problem Report
Program Requirements Control Board
Program Requirements Control Board Document
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Purge Sequence Number
Quality Control
Quick Disconnect
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QM
RCS
RH
RHC
RI
RM
RMS
rpm
RSRM
RTLS
S/N
SAIL
SCCS
scim
see
SEM
SII
SIP
SLF
SM
SOV
SR&QA
SRB
SRM
SSC
SSME
SSRP
TEM
TFL
TPMS
TPS
TPTA
TVC
USBI
Qualifiction Motor
Reaction Control System
Right-Hand
Rotational Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Redundancy Management System
Revolutions Per Minute
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Return-To-Launch Site
Serial Number
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Standard Cubic Inch Per Minute
Second
Scanning Electron Microscope
Solid Rocket Motor Igniter Initiator
Strain Isolation Pad
Shuttle Landing Facility
System Management
Shutoff Valve
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Stennis Space Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Test Evaluation Motor
Telemetry Format Load
Tire Pressure Monitoring System
Thermal Protection System
Transient Pressure Test Article
Thrust Vector Control
United Space Boosters, Inc.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
VAC
WSB
WWMS
Volts Alternating Current
Water Spray Boiler
Waste Water Management System
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